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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 960227-CA 
v. 
Priority No. 2 
RANDY J. MONTOYA, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Randy J. Montoya appeals his conviction for unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance (heroin), Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), a third 
degree felony, entered by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny Montoya's motion to suppress physical 
evidence found in the passenger compartment and trunk of an automobile under his 
control, following Montoya's arrest for public intoxication? 
2. Did the trial court correctly deny Montoya's motion to suppress his 
admission to heroin use, made in response to a postarrest, police question posed before 
"Miranda" warnings were administered? 
A "bifurcated" appellate review standard applies for each issue: Underlying 
fact findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The court's 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, with a "measure of deference" accorded 
to highly fact-sensitive conclusions. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 
1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-71 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This case involves the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
This case also implicates the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, set forth in 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("nor shall [an accused] be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Montoya was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(heroin), a third degree felony, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, and with public intoxication, a class C misdemeanor (R. 5-6). He moved 
to suppress paraphernalia and heroin seized from an automobile in his control at the time 
of his arrest, contending that police illegally searched the automobile. He also moved to 
suppress statements made by him when arrested, contending that the statements arose 
during interrogation that had not been preceded by the warnings mandated in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (R. 20-31). After a hearing, review of a defense 
memorandum, and argument, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, denying the motion to suppress (R. 50-54, copied in the appendix to this brief). 
Montoya then entered a conditional guilty plea to the controlled substance 
charge, reserving, under Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) and State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 
App. 1988), the right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress (R. 42). The 
paraphernalia and intoxication charges were dismissed (R. 48, 55). He was sentenced to a 
term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison, said sentence to run concurrently with 
a sentence imposed for a prior offense (R. 55). Montoya's appeal was dismissed for 
failure to timely file a notice of appeal, but was reinstated via sentencing nunc pro tunc 
and a new notice of appeal (R. 169-76,184-85). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State recites the facts in a light supporting the trial court's denial of 
Montoya's motion to suppress. See, e.g., State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182,1186 (Utah 
1995). At about 3 A.M. on a summer night, West Valley City Police officers Gill and 
Schmidt answered a call from a Seven-Eleven convenience store, complaining of "an 
unknown individual out front bothering customers, walking around in his underwear" (R. 
50, 95). They encountered Montoya in front of the store, "wearing only boxer shorts and 
sandals. He was walking about in a nervous manner. His movements were 'jerky.' His 
behavior was erratic. He was talking to himself (R. 51, 96). Gill asked Montoya "if he 
was on any medication or anything." Montoya responded "that he had a few beers and 
had smoked a joint" (R. 96). 
Generally, Montoya was poorly responsive to Officer Gill's questions, often 
giving answers not related to the questions (R. 96). Officer Schmidt observed that 
Montoya "appeared intoxicated. He seemed more extreme than that. That's why I wasn't 
sure what he might have been under the influence of because after he said he was on 
alcohol and also possibly some marijuana, he was acting a little bit more strange than 
that, that I've seen" (R. 121). Montoya's behavior became more erratic as Officer Gill 
spoke with him (R. 96). 
Based upon Montoya's worsening condition, Officer Gill arrested him for 
public intoxication; Gill also decided to summon medical assistance to evaluate Montoya 
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(R. 51, 97,125-26). Gill handcuffed Montoya, seated him in a police cruiser, and radioed 
for medical assistance (R. 51,97). Gill also radioed for assistance from another officer, 
McCarthy, who "was a little more educated on different types of effects of controlled 
substances or what might be going on with Mr. Montoya" (R. 97-98, 51). 
Officer McCarthy arrived promptly (R. 107). McCarthy knew and 
recognized Montoya, and 'talked to him to see if he was all right" (R. 107). McCarthy 
observed that Montoya "had foaming of the mouth. He was real jittery. His eyes were 
dilated and I asked him point-blank, and also he had marks on him to show that he had 
been intravenously ingesting something, so I asked him — street term. I asked him if he 
was doing some cheve. He stated he was, which is a street term for heroin" (R. 108, 51). 
Montoya also told McCarthy that "he was going to overdose" (R. 118). McCarthy did not 
administer "Miranda" warnings prior to thus questioning Montoya, explaining that his 
questions had been related to Montoya's intoxicated medical condition (R. 114,118). 
The officers then turned their attention to the Mitsubishi automobile that 
Montoya had driven to the Seven-Eleven. As related by Officer Gill, "Policy states that 
we impound vehicles for driver arrests, city impound which I was going to do" (R. 98). 
Per their procedure, Gill and Schmidt began "an inventory of all items in the vehicle" (R. 
98); however, they "did not use an inventory or impound form" (R. 51, 104). In the 
Mitsubishi's passenger compartment, Officer Gill found "money was thrown everywhere. 
Dollars were scattered on the floor and when I reached in the passenger side, I saw a 
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syringe and a spoon sticking - stuck in between the center console and the passenger seat 
and when I saw this, it caught my eye. It's commonly used paraphernalia for different 
sorts of ingestion of different types of controlled substances" (R. 98-99). 
After assessing Montoya's condition, and while efforts were being made to 
identify the Mitsubishi's owner, Officer McCarthy assisted with the inventory search (R. 
108). McCarthy examined the spoon and syringe, and determined that they carried a 
"familiar" odor-evidently of narcotics (R. 109). In the Mitsubishi's trunk, McCarthy 
found "a small little container. I can't remember what it was, but there were five balloons 
with aluminum foil" (R. 109). Based upon his past experience as a narcotics officer, 
McCarthy determined that the balloons contained black tar heroin (R. 109). 
Meanwhile, the Mitsubishi's owner had been identified: it belonged to 
Montoya's girlfriend, whom McCarthy knew (R. 23, 52, 109-10,115). Accordingly, in 
his authority as patrol supervisor that night, McCarthy decided that rather than towing the 
Mitsubishi to an impound lot, he would attempt to return it to the owner (R. 110-11). 
Besides being driven by a desire to avoid expense and inconvenience to the owner, 
McCarthy's decision was based upon the fact that the Mitsubishi carried a large lien, and 
therefore was not a vehicle for which the State would pursue forfeiture (R. 52,117). This 
decision was made after the heroin had been found (R. 52). With considerable difficulty, 
McCarthy eventually found Montoya's girlfriend, and helped her to retrieve her 
Mitsubishi (R. 115-16). 
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Montoya was taken to a hospital, and treated for his heroin intoxication (R. 
136). His prosecution and motion to suppress ensued, as already described. Montoya 
now appeals, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Mitsubishi was properly subjected to an inventory search incident to 
its impoundment. A noninvestigatory purpose supported the impoundment, the search 
was conducted according to police policy, and no "pretext" analysis should apply to 
invalidate such an otherwise lawful search. The fact that officers eventually returned the 
Mitsubishi to its owner does not change this result. Alternatively, the vehicle's interior 
was properly searched incident to Montoya's arrest, and the entire vehicle was properly 
searched based upon probable cause and exigent circumstances. Montoya's intoxicated 
condition and admission to heroin use constituted the probable cause. The Mitsubishi's 
inherent mobility, plus the need to promptly find the intoxicating substance, constituted 
the exigent circumstances supporting the search. 
2. Although not recognized by the trial court, Montoya's admission that he 
had ingested heroin, made before he was given his "Miranda" warnings, was admissible 
under the "public safety" exception to the "Miranda" rule. Under this exception, 
announced in the United States Supreme Court's Quarles decision, Miranda warnings are 
unnecessary when an officer is conjfronted with an immediate safety risk, and questions a 
suspect in an effort to resolve that risk. In this case, an immediate risk was posed by 
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Montoya's deteriorating, intoxicated condition. It was therefore proper for Officer 
McCarthy to ask him whether he had ingested heroin, in order to assure prompt, effective 
medical treatment. Accordingly, Montoya's admission was not subject to suppression 
under the Miranda rule. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
MONTOYA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
FOUND IN THE MITSUBISHI 
In his first point on appeal, Montoya argues that the trial court erroneously 
upheld the search of the Mitsubishi as an "inventory search" incident to the vehicle's 
impoundment-^ settled exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The State disagrees. The Mitsubishi 
was subjected to a valid inventory search. In addition, the Mitsubishi's interior was 
properly searched incident to Montoya's lawful arrest, and the entire vehicle was properly 
searched based upon probable cause and exigent circumstances. These latter grounds, 
although not addressed by the trial court, may be raised to affirm the trial court's 
judgment. State v. South, P.2d , 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1996). 
A. The Inventory Search of the Entire Vehicle Was Proper. 
Montoya challenges the inventory search in three ways. He first argues that 
officers had no legitimate basis to impound the Mitsubishi (Br. of Appellant at 21). Next, 
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Montoya argues that the inventory search was improper because it was not proven to be 
in conformity with police procedure (id. at 25). Finally, he argues that the search was 
unconstitutionally "pretextual" (id. at 33). This Court should reject all three challenges. 
1. The Mitsubishi Was Legitimately Subject to Impoundment 
Montoya first argues that it was unnecessary to impound the Mitsubishi. 
This argument is not preserved by presentation to the trial court, appearing neither in 
Montoya's memorandum supporting suppression nor in oral argument of the motion (R. 
20-31,139-43). Montoya does not allege "plain error" or any other exception to the rule 
that issues thus unpreserved are waived on appeal. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208-09 (Utah 1993). Therefore, Montoya's first argument is waived by default. 
This argument also fails on its merits, notwithstanding that Montoya finds 
support for it in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). In Hygh, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that for a vehicle impoundment to be valid, a "reasonable and proper 
justification for impoundment of the vehicle" must be demonstrated; such "necessity" for 
impoundment must be proven by the State. 711 P.2d at 268. That portion of the Hygh 
opinion is no longer an accurate statement of Fourth Amendment law. 
Two years after Hygh was issued, the United States Supreme Court held, in 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), that police officers legitimately have discretion 
to impound an arrestee's vehicle, "so long as discretion is exercised according to standard 
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of criminal activity." Id. at 
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375. By that holding, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the claim that before a 
vehicle can be impounded, officers must inquire about possible "alternative dispositions" 
for the vehicle. See id at 375-76. The "alternative disposition" inquiry is merely another 
term for a "necessity of impoundment" inquiry. Therefore, in rejecting an "alternative 
disposition" inquiry, the Supreme Court in Bertine effectively held that an impoundment 
need not be "necessary" in order to be constitutionally valid. 
While courts in other jurisdictions have sometimes held that police must 
exhaust alternative dispositions before impounding an automobile, such decisions, like 
Hygh, generally predate Bertine. See, e.g., State v. McDaniel, 156 N.J. Super. 347, 354-
55, 383 A.2d 1174 (1978); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.3(c) at 520 n.55 
(citing cases) (3rd ed. 1996); see also State v. Rice, 111 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam).1 Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court, in light of Bertine, has specifically overruled 
its pre-Bertine cases holding that law officers must show "reasonable necessity" for 
impoundment. See State v. Aderholt, 545 N.W.2d 559, 564 (Iowa 1996). 
In this case, impoundment of the Mitsubishi was proper under Bertine. 
First, impoundment was initiated under standardized police criteria. As explained by 
xIn Rice, the Utah Supreme Court ordered suppression in an inventory search case 
because the police officers in question had no written policy governing such searches, because 
the State conceded that officers lacked authority to impound the vehicle, and because "the 
impoundment and search were admittedly a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive." 
717 P.2d at 696-97. The absence of standard policy, by itself, invalidated the impoundment and 
search; the State's concession and the "pretext" conclusion (the latter based upon now-repudiated 
"pretext" analysis, see State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)), amounted to dictum. 
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Officer Gill, "[p]olicy states that we impound vehicles for driver arrests, city impound 
which I was going to do" (R. 98). Officer McCarthy had helped to write the West Valley 
City impoundment and inventory policy, which he explained as follows: "Any time we 
arrest anybody, any time a vehicle's going to be impounded, an inventory will be done, 
and if possible, a canine officer will have the dog do a sniff of the vehicle for the 
purposes of looking for narcotics" (R. 110-11). This unrebutted testimony established 
that the Mitsubishi was impounded pursuant to standard policy.2 
2Montoya miscites the record in an effort to show that policy was not followed in the 
impoundment and inventory search (Br. of Appellant at 29). The complete exchange recited by 
Montoya, between the prosecutor and Officer McCarthy, was as follows: 
Q [(hy prosecutor)] And what is that policy with respect to making inventory 
searches of vehicles? In what circumstances is that done? 
A [(McCarthy)] Any time we arrest anybody, any time a vehicle's going to be 
impounded, an inventory will be done, and if possible, a canine officer will have 
the dog do a sniff of the vehicle for purposes of looking for narcotics. 
Q And was that policy followed in this instance? 
AI think we had called for a canine, but they got off at two that morning, so there 
wasn 't one available. 
Q Now, do you ordinarily make an inventory list in the course of this inventory 
search? 
A No, if there's something out of place, you would note it. If there was 
something of value or something like that, you could take it into custody or you 
could give it to the owner. We do have an inventory sheet. I very frequently use 
it. I just note it in the narrative of the report. 
(R. 110-11 (the italicized exchange is omitted from Montoya's recitation)). The fair 
interpretation of McCarthy's testimony is that the impoundment and inventory policy was 
followed, with the exception that the canine sniff was not done. 
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Next, the officers in this case had a reason for impounding the Mitsubishi 
apart from (i.e., in addition to) their desire to search it for narcotics. As the trial court 
observed, the vehicle could not be left in the Seven-Eleven parking lot at 3:00 A.M. (R. 
53). Such disposition raised a risk that the Mitsubishi might be damaged or stolen. In 
order to adequately prevent such mishap-an accepted justification for impoundment, see 
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267, Strickling, 844 R2d at 986-the officers who arrested Montoya 
properly decided to impound the Mitsubishi. 
As it happened, Officer McCarthy aborted the impoundment when he 
located the Mitsubishi's owner, and returned the vehicle to her (R. 113,115-16). 
However, this unusual fact pattern does not compel a different holding with respect to the 
police actions taken up to that point. There was, after all, no certainty that McCarthy 
would find the vehicle's owner. Had they delayed their impoundment procedures until 
the owner was found, the officers risked a claim that the Mitsubishi might be damaged, or 
property stolen from it, while it was arguably under their care. Until the owner was 
located-achieved only by "extraordinary" effort (R. 115)--the officers were justified in 
proceeding with their impoundment procedure, including the inventory search. See State 
v. Allen, 817 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. App. 1991) (impoundment and inventory were proper 
even though defendant's girlfriend offered to take custody of automobile); People v. 
Burch, 188 Cal. App. 3d 172,232 Cal. Rptr. 502 (5th Dist. 1986) (inventory search was 
proper even though officers eventually cancelled plan to impound vehicle); United States 
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v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263,1271 (9th Cir. 1977) (inventory search proper before 
returning vehicle to its rightful owner). 
In other words, what really happened was the officers initiated their 
impoundment procedure while simultaneously trying to locate the Mitsubishi's owner. 
Had the owner not been located, impoundment would have been completed according to 
the police department policy, and would have been proper under the Fourth Amendment. 
It would make no sense to penalize the officers for going out of their way to find the 
Mitsubishi's owner while also proceeding according to policy. By thus seeking an 
alternative to impoundment, the officers were, as already explained, doing more than the 
Fourth Amendment requires. Accordingly, their actions were constitutionally reasonable, 
and the evidence seized during the inventory search should not be suppressed on the 
ground that impoundment was "unnecessary." 
2. The Inventory Search Complied with Police Procedure. 
Nor can Montoya prevail in his claim that the trial court erroneously found 
that the inventory search was performed in compliance with the West Valley City Police 
Department's standard procedure (R. 53). As explained above, unrebutted officer 
testimony demonstrated the existence of such procedure, which was followed in this case 
(R. 98,110-11). It was not necessary, at the hearing on Montoya's motion to suppress, to 
introduce copies of the written impoundment policy or written inventory forms in order to 
prove the existence of, and compliance with, the applicable policy. See State v. 
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Strickling, 844 P.2d 979,988-990 (Utah App. 1992). Therefore, as in Strickling, 844 P.2d 
at 990, the trial court did not commit "clear error" by finding that the inventory search in 
this case was conducted "according to procedures" (R. 53). 
Montoya makes too much of the fact that the police officers in this case did 
not fill out a written inventory form, documenting items found during the inventory 
search (R. 104,116, 124; Br. of Appellant at 27-30). He cites no case law holding that 
failure to fill out an inventory form, in and of itself, renders an inventory search invalid. 
To the contrary, at least one appellate court has rejected that contention. See Carson v. 
State, 241 Ga. 622,247 S.E.2d 68, 70 (1978) ("The failure to furnish appellant an 
inventory is a ministerial act and does not affect the validity of the search and seizure"). 
Furthermore, from the officer testimony in this case, it appears that the West Valley 
Police impoundment policy does not require completion of an inventory form; instead, 
out-of-the-ordinary items found in a vehicle are noted in a standard police report (R. 104-
06,111,116-17). Additionally, the eventual return of the Mitsubishi to its owner 
eliminated the need (if any) to complete an inventory form. Thus the trial court correctly 
ruled that "[t]he fact that an inventory sheet was not used was not fatal" (R. 53). 
Montoya also complains that the State did not adequately prove that the 
West Valley Police impoundment and inventory search procedure is "designed to produce 
an inventory," as required in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,4 (1990). Specifically, he 
notes that the State did not demonstrate that the procedure in this case directs officers to 
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search the trunk, under the spare tire, and inside closed containers-the areas in which the 
heroin-containing balloons were found (Br. of Appellant at 33). This complaint also fails. 
At the hearing on his motion to suppress, Montoya never questioned 
whether the inventory search policy in this case encompassed an automobile's trunk. He 
therefore waived this complaint by default. Further, that trial-level default was 
reasonable. An automobile's trunk is an obvious area of concern when conducting an 
inventory search; valuable items obviously could be kept in the trunk and areas within the 
trunk, such as the spare tire well (R. 112-13). By not questioning the trunk search as a 
legitimate part of an inventory search, Montoya proceeded in accord with knowledge that 
inventory search policies invariably include a search of an automobile's trunk. It would 
be an odd inventory policy that included a canine sniff, but did not include inspection of 
an automobile's trunk and the opening of closed containers. Even though it would have 
been better to more thoroughly describe the inventory search policy in this case, it is 
reasonable to infer, on appeal, that the policy in question directed officers to search the 
trunk of any impounded automobile. Therefore, the contraband found in the Mitsubishi's 
trunk was legitimately seized. 
3. No "Pretext Inventory Search " Analysis is Appropriate. 
This Court should reject Montoya's claim that the inventory search was 
unconstitutionally "pretextual." The Utah Supreme Court has rejected "pretext" analysis 
of both roadside detentions, State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), and of 
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warrantless arrests, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). In Whren v. United 
States, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996), the United States Supreme Court followed 
suit with respect to roadside detentions, but left open the possibility that automobile 
inventory searches, following impoundment, might be deemed unconstitutionally 
"pretextual." 116 S. Ct. at 1773,1774. That possibility was evidently left open because 
of dictum in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), and Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 
(1990) (both discussed in Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773). 
However, the possibility of a "pretext inventory search" analysis is 
distinctly out of step with all of the Supreme Court's other Fourth Amendment law, 
canvassed in Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774, holding that objective actions, rather than 
"ulterior" officer motives, are at issue in determining whether police action is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. For the same reasons set forth in Whren and in the Utah 
Supreme Court's Lopez decision, 873 P.2d at 1135-38, there is no sound reason to 
invalidate an automobile inventory search merely because the officer conducting the 
search harbored an "ulterior motive" to uncover evidence of a crime. 
Further, in Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court rejected "pretext" doctrine as 
applied to full custodial arrests, again explaining that officer motivation has no place in 
the question whether an arrest is valid. 910 P.2d at 1204-06. It would be incongruous to 
hold that an inventory search of an automobile, which is far less intrusive than a custodial 
arrest, can be deemed unconstitutionally "pretextual" simply because the officer was 
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motivated by the desire to find contraband. In short, no "pretext inventory search" 
analysis should apply. To the contrary, sound law holds that so long as an inventory 
search is conducted in compliance with standardized policy, it is proper under the Fourth 
Amendment. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 378-81 (1976) (Powell, J., 
concurring); Strickling, 844 P.2d at 987-89. Because the inventory search in this case 
was conducted in compliance with the applicable police policy, it was proper. The trial 
court's judgment on this point should be affirmed. 
B. The Mitsubishi's Passenger Compartment Was Properly Searched 
Incident to Montoya's Arrest. 
Even if this Court were to condemn the inventory search, it would not 
follow, as Montoya demands, that "all items seized from the vehicle must be suppressed" 
(Br. of Appellant at 38). There are alternative grounds upon which the trial court's denial 
of Montoya's motion to suppress can be affirmed. As explained in State v. South, 
P.2d , 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 5 (Utah 1996), the "affirm on any proper ground" 
principle is a settled principle of appellate review. 
In this case, the State raises alternative grounds to affirm the trial court's 
judgment that were not raised in the trial court. The court in South stated: "We do not 
here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an argument in defense of the 
lower court's judgment when that argument was not presented in the lower court." South, 
298 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6 n.3. However, in Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass % 23 
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Utah 2d 222,461 P.2d 290 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court did address that question, and 
answered it affirmatively. In Limb, the court held that a trial court judgment can be 
affirmed on a ground not argued in the trial court, provided that the record supports such 
alternative ground. Limb, 461 P.2d at 293 n.2.3 In this case, there are record-supported 
alternative grounds to affirm the trial court's judgment. 
The first such alternative ground addresses only the search of the 
Mitsubishi's passenger compartment, where the spoon and syringe were found. That 
search was proper incident to Montoya's lawful arrest for public intoxication. The scope 
of such a search properly extends to the passenger compartment of a recently-occupied 
automobile, even if the arrestee has been handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle, as 
occurred in this case. See State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.) (thorough review 
3The cited footnote in Limb addressed Justice Henriod's dissent: 
The dissent in this case is without merit. The law is well settled that a trial court should 
be affirmed if on the record made it can be. The general law is stated in 5 C.J.S. Appeal 
& Error § 1464(1) as follows: "* * * The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, 
or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be 
the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not 
urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not 
considered or passed on by the lower court. * * *" 
461 P.2d at 203 n.2. The footnote went on to explain that while a judgment can be affirmed on 
any proper ground, it will not be reversed on grounds not advanced in the trial court. Id. This 
latter rule is tempered, however, by the modem rule of "plain error," State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201,1208 (Utah 1993). The "plain error" rule, which aids appellants, counterbalances the 
appellee-aiding "affirm on any ground" rule. 
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of "search incident to arrest" cases and authority), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 
1996); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (the leading case). 
At the hearing on his motion to suppress, Montoya admitted that he had 
driven the Mitsubishi to the Seven-Eleven store (R. 128). Lacking adequate pocket 
money to complete his purchase, he went back out to the Mitsubishi to retrieve some 
more money (R. 128-29). Just as he got out of the car and was heading back into the 
store, Officers Gill and Schmidt arrived (R. 129). Thus the Mitsubishi had been recently 
occupied by Montoya when he was arrested, and its passenger compartment was, under 
Moreno and its underpinning authority, properly searched incident to Montoya9s arrest. 
Therefore, the spoon and syringe seized during that search are admissible evidence, 
supporting at least partial affirmance of the trial court's judgment. 
C. The Mitsubishi Was Properly Searched Due to Probable Cause and 
Exigent Circumstances. 
As the second alternative ground for affirmance, the entire Mitsubishi was 
properly searched due to the existence of probable cause to believe that the vehicle 
contained contraband, coupled with exigent circumstances. The "probable cause plus 
exigent circumstances" search justification is a settled exception to the warrant 
requirement. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991); State v. Anderson, 
910 P.2d 1229,1237 (Utah 1996). Both probable cause and exigent circumstances are 
determined with respect to the totality of the circumstances, or "mosaic of evidence," 
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known at the time of the search. State v. Ashe, IAS P.2d 1255,1258 (Utah 1987). When 
an automobile is searched, the showing of exigent circumstances need not be so strong as 
when a home is searched. City of Or em v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,1389 (Utah App. 
1994). In this case, the record demonstrates that probable cause and exigent 
circumstances existed when the Mitsubishi was searched. 
1. Probable Cause. 
Probable cause means a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found" in the area to be searched. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 
(1983). Such a "fair probability" was encountered by Officers Gill and Schmidt from the 
moment they observed Montoya, who appeared intoxicated. Clad only in underwear, 
Montoya appeared "nervous," with "jerky" movements and "erratic" behavior, which 
included "talking to himself (R. 51,96, 121). His condition was "more extreme" than 
the officers typically encountered with a drunken person (R. 121). Montoya gave 
unresponsive answers to questions, but did manage to admit "that he had a few beers and 
had smoked a joint" (R. 96). Officer McCarthy further noted that Montoya had needle 
marks (R. 108). In response to Officer McCarthy's question, Montoya admitted that he 
had ingested heroin (R. 108). 
Under these circumstances, it arguably would have been irresponsible for 
the police officers not to check the Mitsubishi for contraband-particularly, intoxicants. 
Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27-29 (1968) (suspect's unusual behavior justified "stop 
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and frisk"). There existed a fair probability that the vehicle contained an open alcohol 
container, illicit substances, illicit paraphernalia, or all of these things. Any of such items 
would, of course, be evidence of criminal conduct. 
Furthermore, because the Mitsubishi's passenger compartment was properly 
searched incident to Montoya's arrest, the syringe and spoon found therein add to 
probable cause, supporting a search of the entire vehicle. The presence of such 
paraphernalia naturally suggests the presence of illicit drugs, which could easily be 
secreted anywhere in the vehicle—including the trunk. Furthermore, Montoya was highly 
disorganized in his behavior: besides his already-described jitteriness and garbled speech, 
he had evidently littered the Mitsubishi's interior with cash (R. 98-99). There was, 
therefore, a fair probability that he had placed contraband in the trunk. 
2. Exigent Circumstances. 
Exigent circumstances existed under the traditional concern that an 
automobile's inherent mobility poses a risk that evidence will be lost if a search is not 
promptly conducted. Hence, an entire automobile may be searched, either immediately or 
later, without a warrant. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569-70. Such exigency existed in this 
case, because the Mitsubishi was surely going to be moved from the Seven-Eleven store-
if not by the police, then by its owner. Thus had the search not been conducted, the 
evidence contained in the vehicle would have been lost. 
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The unique circumstances of this case also gave rise to another type of 
exigency. When encountered by Officers Gill and Schmidt, Montoya's intoxication was 
of a nature unusual to the officers-that is, beyond what they expected from Montoya's 
admission to beer and marijuana use. Further, his condition appeared to be worsening, to 
such a degree that the officers specially called for medical help (R. 51,96-97,125-26).4 
Montoya had needle marks on his arm, and admitted heroin ingestion; Montoya also told 
Officer McCarthy that "he was going to overdose" (R. 108,118). 
Thus faced with what objectively appeared to be a medical emergency, the 
police officers were justified in promptly searching the Mitsubishi, in order to find and 
confirm the identity of the substance or substances that caused Montoya's unusual 
intoxication, and that might also be used for a self-destructive overdose. It was also 
possible that such search might reveal evidence of a medical ailment or treatment that 
contributed to Montoya's condition. Such information could prove valuable (perhaps 
lifesaving) to the medical personnel who would be called upon to assist Montoya. 
Finally, the officers were duty-bound to find whatever intoxicating substance might be in 
the Mitsubishi, to prevent anybody else from ingesting it. See New York v. Quarles, 467 
U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (prompt search for hidden gun was justified in part by concern for 
public safety). 
4The summoned medical help was in addition to the assistance sought from Officer 
McCarthy. However, firemen, rather than paramedics, were dispatched to the scene (R. 118-19). 
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In other words, a "community caretaking" obligation, similar to that 
endorsed by this Court in Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1992), ajfd, 
875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994), justified the Mitsubishi's prompt search (perhaps even 
independently of probable cause). In Warden, involving the stop of a driver who had 
threatened suicide, this Court adopted a "community caretaking" justification for 
detentions under the Fourth Amendment. A similar justification should apply to searches. 
In particular, "circumstances threatening life or safety," which justify a detention under 
Warden, 844 P.2d at 363, should also be deemed to justify a search.5 In this case, as just 
explained, such circumstances were present: Montoya was in a deteriorating intoxicated 
condition, and spoke about "overdosing." 
Accordingly, in addition to the exigency posed by the Mitsubishi's 
mobility, the officers' community caretaking responsibility in this case justified their 
prompt search of the vehicle. Coupled with probable cause to believe that the vehicle 
contained contraband, these exigent circumstances supported the search. For this 
5In Warden, this Court established a three-part test to assess whether a detention is proper 
under the "community caretaking" exception to the warrant requirement: (1) Did a Fourth 
Amendment "seizure" occur? (2) Was the seizure "in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker 
function" that a "reasonable officer" would have pursued? (3) Did the circumstances objectively 
"demonstrate an imminent danger to life or limb?" 844 P.2d at 364. Parts (1) and (2) can be 
adapted to a search by substituting the word "search" for "seizure," although part (2) may be a 
dead letter, for it was based upon "pretext" analysis developed by this Court in State v. Lopez, 
831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992), which was subsequently rejected by the Utah Supreme Court, 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). 
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alternative reason, the trial court's judgment, denying Montoya's motion to suppress the 
physical evidence, should be affirmed. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MONTOYA'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS INCRIMINATING 
STATEMENT TO OFFICER MCCARTHY 
Montoya next argues that his postarrest admission to Officer McCarthy, that 
he had ingested heroin, should have been suppressed because that admission was made 
before Montoya was apprised of his "Miranda" rights.6 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966) (in-custody suspect must be apprised of, and waive, his counsel and silence 
rights before interrogation may proceed). This argument also fails. The trial court 
correctly denied Montoya's motion to suppress his admission, albeit for a different reason 
than that identified by the court. See State v. South, P.2d , 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 
5 (Utah 1996) (discussed in Point One, pages 17-18 of this brief). 
The record suggests that Montoya was read his "Miranda" warnings at 
some point (R. 105, Br. of Appellant at 43), but does not indicate whether this was done 
prior to, or after, Officer McCarthy "asked him if he was doing some cheve [(heroin)]" 
(R. 108). McCarthy admitted that he did not administer "Miranda" warnings because his 
intention in questioning Montoya was not criminal interrogation, but to assess his medical 
6In the trial court, Montoya also urged suppression of hisprearrest admission that he had 
consumed beer and marijuana (R. 25). He does not pursue that argument on appeal. 
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condition (R. 118). The trial court ruled that "[t]here were no incriminating statements 
made after [Montoya's] arrest" (R. 53). 
The record does not support that ruling. The court found that Officers Gill 
and Schmidt arrested and handcuffed Montoya before Officer McCarthy arrived (R. 51), 
and there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of that finding. Normally under such 
circumstances, "Miranda" warnings were required before Montoya could be interrogated. 
The trial court made no finding that Montoya was so warned before McCarthy asked 
whether he had ingested heroin; indeed, the court appears to have tacitly found that 
Montoya was not warned under Miranda (R. 144, referring to "fact or failure to 
Mirandize the defendant"). Thus normally, Montoya's admission would have been 
suppressed under the Miranda rule. 
But McCarthy's question to Montoya was proper, and Montoya's response 
admissible, under the common sense-based "public safety" exception to the Miranda 
requirement, established in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). In Quarles, a 
police officer apprehended a suspected armed rapist inside a store. Discovering that the 
suspect was wearing an empty holster, the officer handcuffed him and asked the suspect 
where the gun was. Stating, "the gun is over there," the suspect directed the officer to a 
nearby carton, from which a pistol was retrieved. Only then did the officer read the 
suspect his Miranda warning. 467 U.S. at 652. 
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The Supreme Court held that both the pistol and the statement "the gun is 
over there" were admissible at trial, crafting "a narrow exception to the Miranda rule" 
based upon the need to protect public safety: 
We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a 
situation posing a threat to public safety outweighs the need for the 
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against 
self-incrimination. We decline to place officers such as Officer 
Kraft in the untenable situation of having to consider, often in a 
matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the 
necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render 
whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them 
to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of 
evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their 
ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation 
confronting them. 
Quarks, 467 U.S. at 657-58. The Court expressly rejected the suggestion that the 
suspect's response, "the gun is over there," might be suppressed under Miranda, while 
permitting admission of the pistol: "[W]e do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings 
of Miranda require us to exclude the evidence, thus penalizing officers for asking the 
very questions which are the most crucial to their efforts to protect themselves and the 
public." Id. at 658 n.7; see also id. at 659. 
The Quarles opinion reveals two elements comprising die public safety 
exception to the Miranda rule. First, the statement in issue must not be coerced, which 
would amount to a Fifth Amendment violation. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654. Second, the 
officer's questioning must be supported by an actual, immediate danger to safety. Id. at 
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657. Further, the question whether these elements are satisfied "does not depend on the 
motivation of the individual officers involved." Id. at 656. 
Both public safety elements were present in this case. First, as happened in 
Quarks, 467 U.S. at 654, Montoya makes no claim that his admission to ingesting heroin 
was "actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist." Indeed, 
Montoya was confronted by significantly less coercive police conduct than occurred in 
Quarks, where the suspect was stopped at gunpoint, and then "surrounded by at least four 
police officers and was handcuffed when the questioning at issue took place." 467 U.S. at 
655. No guns were pointed at Montoya, only three officers were involved, and at least 
one of those officers was evidently occupied with the Mitsubishi when McCarthy 
questioned Montoya. Cf. United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952,960-61 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(suspect had been arrested at shotgun-point, was spread-eagled on ground when 
questioning occurred; Quarks public safety exception applied). 
Second, a real threat to Montoya's safety was present. As explained in 
Point One (pages 22-23) of this brief, Montoya was badly intoxicated, apparently from 
intravenous drug ingestion, and his condition appeared to be deteriorating when Officer 
McCarthy spoke to him. Under these circumstances, it would have been irresponsible for 
McCarthy to preface his query about heroin use with Miranda warnings, because giving 
those warnings could have deterred Montoya from providing information that was needed 
to preserve his own safety. See Quarks, 467 U.S. at 657. Even a delay in admitting his 
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heroin ingestion, to ponder his Miranda options, could have compromised Montoya's 
safety, by delaying treatment. 
Montoya himself was part of the "public" involved in the "public safety" 
exception to the Miranda rule. In State v. Franks, 119 N.M. 174, 889 P.2d 209 (N.M. 
App. 1994), the New Mexico Court of Appeals followed Quarles in approving officer 
questioning, not preceded by Miranda warnings, of a person who had reported his own 
drug overdose: "When officers respond to a medical emergency and find the victim in 
such a state that he or she may be unable to communicate later with medical personnel, 
the officers have a duty to obtain as much information as they can concerning the 
medically relevant cause of the victim's condition." 889 P.2d at 214. In this case, Officer 
McCarty had a similar duty toward Montoya, who then received medical treatment for his 
apparent heroin overdose (R. 135-36).7 
In sum, the record clearly demonstrates that McCarthy properly asked 
Montoya about heroin use, without first administering Miranda warnings. The "public 
safety" exception to the Miranda rule justified that question. Accordingly, this Court 
should affirm the denial of Montoya's motion to suppress his response. 
Additionally, Montoya's extreme intoxication, and disorganized thinking caused 
thereby, suggests that giving Miranda warnings would have merely confused him. 
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CONCLUSION 
The automobile driven by Montoya was properly searched, and he was 
properly questioned about heroin use at the scene of his arrest. For these reasons, 
Montoya's plea-supported conviction for heroin possession should be AFFIRMED. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JjU_ day of October, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 951900016 FS 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th 
day of February, 1995, on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the 
Defendant being present and represented by David W. Brown and the 
State of Utah represented by Richard S. Shepherd. Testimony was 
taken from Defendant and West Valley Police Officers Paul Gill, 
James Schmidt and William McCarthy. Following the taking of 
evidence, the matter was argued both on the facts and the law by 
both counsel for the Defendant and counsel for the State. The 
Court having heard the evidence and argument and being fully 
advised in the premises makes these Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On August 24, 1994, at 3:07 A.M., West Valley Police 
Officers Gill and Schmidt responded to a call at a Seven-Eleven 
Store located at 4600 South 4000 West. Upon arriving at the scene 
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they found the Defendant, Randy J. Montoya, in the parking lot of 
the store* The Defendant was wearing only boxer shorts and 
sandals. He was walking about in a nervous manner. His movements 
were "jerky." His behavior was erratic. He was talking to 
himself. 
After observing the Defendant the officer came to the 
conclusion that the Defendant was under the influence of some 
drugs, and potentially a danger to himself or others. He was 
placed under arrest and handcuffs were placed on him. When 
questioned by Officer Gill, Defendant said he had consumed alcohol 
and smoked a "joint." 
Officers Gill and Schmidt prepared to impound the car 
inasmuch as the driver was under arrest. They began an inventory 
search. They did not use an inventory or impound form. Inside the 
vehicle between the seats Officer Gill found a hypodermic needle 
and a spoon. Money was found scattered on the floor. The officers 
called for assistance from Officer McCarthy. 
Officer McCarthy, who was the supervising officer and 
also an expert in narcotics matters, came to the scene. He 
observed the Defendant. He saw that he was frothing at the mouth, 
his eyes were dilated and there appeared to be fresh needle marks 
on his arms. Officer McCarthy, based upon his prior experience, 
believed the Defendant had ingested drugs. He was afraid that the 
Defendant may have overdosed. Medical help was called, and 
eventually the Defendant was taken to the hospital. 
Officer McCarthy looked in the trunk area of the car. In 
the area under the spare tire he found five containers containing 
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a substance that he believed to be black tar heroin. 
Officer McCarthy testified that he determined that the 
car that the Defendant had driven was in fact owned by someone 
other than the Defendant, and that the owner was a person with whom 
he was acquainted. He testified that as the supervising officer he 
decided not to impound the car, but to notify the real owner. The 
decision not to impound was made after the drugs were found. He 
testified that the car was a new car with a large lien, that would 
not be a likely prospect for forfeiture, and further that he wished 
to save the owner cost and inconvenience. The car was returned to 
the owner. At the time McCarthy returned the car, he asked to 
search the apartment of the vehicle's owner, Shannon Pina. She 
refused to consent to the search. 
He further testified that the West Valley impound 
procedure, which he assisted in formulating, provides that a 
special inventory list was not necessary in all circumstances. In 
some circumstances the contents of the car could be noted in the 
police report. The officers had considerable discretion in how to 
proceed. He further testified that an inventory list was not 
prepared in this case, but that the money, needle, spoon and heroin 
removed from the car were noted in the police report. No other 
contents of the car were noted in the police report. 
The Defendant testified that he was not in fact 
intoxicated. He admitted that he had in fact used heroin earlier, 
and that he was taken to the hospital where he was treated for the 
effects of that drug. Defendant testified that the vehicle was 
searched two times, the items being seized on the second search. 
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COECfrVSIPHS OF IAW 
The Court finds that the testimony of the officers was 
credible. There was a legitimate basis for the arrest. It was a 
lawful arrest. There were no incriminating statements made after 
the arrest. 
After the arrest it was reasonable to begin impoundment 
procedures, the car could not be left in the parking lot at 3:00 
A.M. Examination of the car preparatory to impoundment was 
according to procedures. The fact that an inventory sheet was not 
used was not fatal. The process was interrupted by the supervising 
officer's decision to return the car to its rightful owner. The 
search was not inappropriate, it was part of legitimate steps taken 
in the process of impoundment, which process was interrupted by the 
decision of Officer McCarthy. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this VWra 
ay of March, 1995. 
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